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Abstract-A random key pre-distribution scheme based on key updating (RKKU) was proposed, which is 
effective in wireless sensor networks. Firstly, the base station will randomly distribute some keys, a 
hash function and some code slices to each node. Furthermore, the RKKU scheme compares with the 
information of some random key to find the same key, and computes the communication key between 
two sensor nodes with one-way hash function. Since the one-way hash function can ensure that the 
attacker cannot use the obtained communication key to decipher the source key, it affects only two 
nodes communicate with each other. To assure the communication security, the key updating was 
designed based on code segment. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme can meet the security 
requirement of key management, and it also has less computation cost and storage cost than the 
existing schemes. 
 
Index terms: wireless sensor networks; code slices; pre-distribution; key updating, one-way hash function. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the technology development of sensors, low-power electronics and radio frequency 
identification (RFID), wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have become one of the most active 
frontier fields related to interdisciplinary studies and advanced technology. The researches on 
WSNs have tremendous significance and important scientific value. The sensor nodes just have 
limited resources and they are often deployed in harsh or adversary environments. Therefore, the 
nodes are easily to be captured by attackers. The security problems of wireless sensor networks 
are widely concerned.  
Existing work has common problems, such as the isolation of sensor nodes, the waste in key pre-
distribution, the leak problem of pre-shared keys, the ignorance or inability of key updating. 
Aiming to solve the hidden troubles of current key updating technologies for wireless sensor 
networks, key pre-distribution schemes are usually considered as the most viable solution. 
Nowadays, there are two main key pre-distribution schemes:  
(1) All nodes communicate with the same pre-distributed key. It is maneuverable and easy to 
implement that any node will use the same pre-distributed key to communicate in WSNs. As 
the saying goes, each has both advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages of this 
scheme are that the security performance is pretty low. Leakage of the master key may make 
the network facing huge threats. 
(2) Using different key between any pair of nodes. Given this wireless sensor network has N 
nodes, if every node is allocated with N-1 different nodes in advance, there will be N*(N-1)/2 
pre-distributed nodes in the network in total. Theoretically, the network security performance 
may be the best. In fact, it is a great waste of storage space that those resource limited nodes 
were allocated so much key in advance, and allocating so much key will increase 
computation and communication cost in WSNs. 
It is inadequate to the mentioned two schemes for real sensor networks. Furthermore 
Eschenauer and Gligor introduced random graphic theory and put forward Random Key Pre-
distributed Scheme
 [1]
 (E-G scheme). By comparison, The E-G scheme is easier to implement its 
algorithm and performs better in computation complexity and augment ability. But this scheme 
has some problems in practical applications, such as bad augment ability, ignoring or being 
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 unable to update the key. How to effectively update the key and guarantee the subsequent 
security of networks are urgent problems in wireless sensor networks.  
 
II. BASIC THEORY AND  ASSUMPTION 
 
a. System Assumption 
Provided nodes are randomly distributed and only common nodes take part in the communication 
process, the fully distributed network model is adopted as system model. And then, Assumptions 
on system model are as follows: 
(1) Every node has its exclusive mark; 
(2) All nodes use the same configuration with equal computation, storage, communication 
resources; 
(3) Nodes will hold still after deployed, no movement, unless captured or damaged. 
Suppose attackers need obtain the message to spend T time from the captured nodes. What’s 
more, during this time, the achievement of each two adjacent nodes are as follows: 
(1)  Exchanging information carried by code segments; 
(2) Compounding programs according to combination and sequence of code segments; 
(3) Entering current key to acquire the next key. Due to little number of code segment (k code 
segment) saved by each node, the time cost of exchanging code segment is relatively low. 
Meanwhile, getting new key by inputting current key needs only k mathematical operation 
which costs little time, thus the assumptions mentioned above are practical. 
b. Network Model 
Ordinary sensor nodes (called nodes or sensor nodes): aside from base station, the hardware 
configuration of all nodes is the same in wireless sensor networks. Every node should be 
responsible for completing basic task of the network (monitoring or locating person), giving 
preliminary process to acquired external data and transmitting the data to base station. Meanwhile 
every node shall undertake the task of transmitting or rebroadcasting the message sent by 
neighbor nodes or the entire network. The latter function is similar with the function of gateway 
or router. 
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 User: Legal user or deplorer in WSNs. provided user has the same management authority and 
ability to access data with base station. Furthermore, user can manage WSNs, obtain data and 
publish related orders (update order) by the base station without energy consumption limits. 
Network Deployment and Scale: In the practical application of WSNs, nodes are randomly shed 
into expected area by aircraft. This means that users or base station can not master and deploy 
position of nodes. In order to decrease the number of independent nodes (nodes without adjacent 
node, independent nodes form single node network), we assume that the dense of nodes in 
deployed area is sufficient enough. 
c. Code Segment 
Code segment pool should be set so large that the probability of getting two absolute same code 
segments close to zero when k code segment(s) were taken out from the pool any two times. In 
other words, the code segments saved by any two sensors are not exactly the same. New updating 
program which will be formed by the combination of some code segments inputs current 
communication key to execute the updating program. And then the output will be the new source 
key among nodes. 
d. One-way hash function 
In order to increase the security performance of key management scheme, One-way hash function 
is imported to improve the ability of this scheme to resist node captured. One-way hash function 
is the function which has the capacity to map a data of any length into a data of fixed length. 
Provided H is a Hash function, h is the given Hash value, x represent a data of any length, and 
then there will be an equation 
               )(xHh                                                                  (1) 
The supposed nature of a safe One-way hash function is as follows: 
(1) One-way. For a given x, it is very easy to calculate h by the function H(x). On the contrary, x 
can not be calculated by the function H(x) within the regular time. 
(2) For the given x, we find another information y to make H(x) equal to H(y). However, the 
information y can not be calculated within the regular time. 
(3) Strong collision resistance. We assume that there exists two information x and y which can 
make H(x) equal to H(y).But the information x and y can not be acquired by calculating 
within the regular time. 
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III. THE RKKU SCHEME 
 
a. Random Pre-distribution 
 Like E-G scheme, a certain number of key materials will randomly be assigned to each node 
before the deployment of network. Firstly, the central sever will generate a code segment pool 
along with a key pool. Secondly, the server will randomly allocate some key material to every 
node, such as m keys (K1……Km e.g.), m keys’ message (MID1...MIDm e.g.), k different code 
segment (code_segment1...code_segmentk), the only node ID of the entire network, a hash 
function H (SHA-1 or RC5 e.g.) and a timer and so on. After key materials are distributed, all 
nodes will randomly be deployed in planned area. 
 
 
Figure 1 Random pre-distribution 
 
b. Importing One-way hash function to Establish Direct Key 
After the deployment of network, nodes will begin to find neighbor nodes by broadcasting pre-
distributed keys’ ID information of themselves and accepting the keys’ ID information of 
neighbor nodes to check if there exists same keys’ ID information in neighbor nodes’ key ID 
information list. If exists, nodes will process all same keys’ ID information through bitwise 
exclusive or operation. Given a and b were mutual neighbor nodes, then  
                
s21ab
...
MIDMIDMIDMID
KKKK                                           (2) 
Where ⊕ represents the XOR operation, s indicates the number of keys with the same ID 
information. After operation, we encrypt the operating result 
abMID
K  with k code segments to 
broadcast to neighbor nodes. Once the code segments received, neighbor nodes will assemble the 
Key pool  
{ K1, K2,K3, K4…KN} 
Code segment 
{
1_ slicecold … Nslicecold _ …} 
…
… 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
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A 
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 {K1,K2,K3,K4…}  
{
1_ slicecold , 2_ slicecold …} 
 {K2,K3,K6,K8…}  
{
4_ slicecold , 7_ slicecold …} 
{K1,K5,K7 ,K9…}  
{
3_ slicecold , 5_ slicecold …
} 
 { K3,K7 ,K8,K9…} 
{
8_ slicecold , 9_ slicecold …
} 
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 acquired k code segments and their own k code segments according to the sequence regulated by 
rk  to form a program p which can be used to update keys. And then nodes use s identical keys to 
perform the XOR operation as follows: 
                 
s21
aaa
0
ab ... KKKK                                                     (3) 
Next node a and node b will execute their first key update, inputting 0abK  to execute update 
program p, so 
               1abK =p (
0
abK )                                                               (4) 
Meanwhile variable i execute a self-increase to record the number of updates. For an arbitrary 
key update (i+1 time), if their current source key is iKab , after key update, the source key will be: 
           1ab
iK =p ( iKab )                                       (5) 
Later on, executing hash operation on 1ab
iK , there will be a new symmetric key: 
             1iabh = ),1(
1
ab
 iKiH                                         (6) 
Node a and b will use the new symmetric key for encryption to execute normal communication. 
c. Adjusting Dynamic Communication Radius as Support to Create Indirect Key 
If two neighbor nodes fail to discover the same key ID information with those they have 
possessed after neighbor discovery that means symmetric key can not be established between the 
two nodes. RKKU and E-G 
[1]
 scheme adopt similar method to create indirect key by establishing 
a safe path with the help of third party node and the path must be safe and reliable. During the 
establishment of symmetric key, frequent negotiation and mutual message communication is 
needed among the nodes. Once the path was monitored, indirect key would be revealed. 
This situation may exist in practical application: once a safe and reliable path could not be found 
between two neighbor nodes, the path could not be relied on to create keys either. Chen
[2]
 
proposed a new method in view of the above mentioned situation that not exist safe path: 
enlarging the communication radius among nodes of those unreal safe path adequately, in this 
way, further more, success rate of linking some special areas can be improved by creating 
indirect key and higher linking security can be granted to WSNs. 
Table 1 represent the changes of the number of neighbor nodes which possesses a node with 30 
original neighbor nodes that unable to establish direct key or seek a safe path to create indirect 
key in an special area of  WSNs. 
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Table 1 the relationship between Communication radius and  
the number of neighbor nodes 
Communication 
radius（multiple） 0 1 2 3 
the number of 
neighbor nodes 30 120 270 480 
 
It can be inferred form table 1 that enlarged communication radius of nodes increased the number 
of their neighbor nodes, if an shared key can be found among new nodes, that means a safe path 
exists, then indirect keys can be created via the path and communication radius of nodes are set 
as initial value at last. 
Provided the density of nodes deployed in the network is large enough to ignore the necessity to 
ensure every node connect with all their neighbor nodes and guarantee information with very 
high probability at the same time, it would be acceptable that partial or very few mutual neighbor 
nodes did not establish safe communication links. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Establishing indirect key 
 
d. Key Update 
The timer will be triggered after WSNs nodes are deployed, when time exceeds T the nodes 
will delete their pre-distributed keys saved by themselves and redundant keys and their hash 
value. Keys’ corresponding ID information will be reserved (for adding new nodes) as well as 
source keys after update. What’s more, some requirement should be met before executing key 
update that the hash value can be updated when the nodes are going to deliver data packets to 
their neighbors except for when time pause T  must longer than a certain cycle T. The 
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 requirement not only can avoid excessive key update among nodes, but also be convenient for 
keeping the synchronism of key update. 
Each node will use a variable i to record the number of time of keys’ update. When node b 
received data packets from node a, firstly the value of variable i saved by node b will be 
compared with the value of variable i in the data packet send by node a and judge if the values of 
variable i are equal, if not, node b will input the key saved by itself which used between node a 
and bode b to execute key update and get a new key. Then executing hash operation to the new 
key, the communication key will be the obtained hash value which can be used to decipher the 
data packet send by node a. If variable i of node b and variable i in the data packet sent by node a 
are equal, so node b will be able to use the hash value saved by it self which used between node a 
and node b to decipher data packet. 
 
e. Adding New Nodes 
To some WSNs with special tasks, they may need longer working life. But the energy restriction 
of sensor nodes themselves makes them confront with troubles that sensors does not work due to 
energy shortage after a period of time. Furthermore, we need to add some nodes properly to 
network deployment area to maintain certain density of nodes. In this case, we need to make use 
of base stations, trustworthy third party or the negotiation among nodes to detect the validity of 
new nodes in order to resist attacks such as forgery and simulation. 
Firstly, new nodes will send their key materials like m keys’ ID information, k different code 
segments and the ID of the only node of the entire network to base station or trustworthy third 
party. 
Later on, base station or trusted third party will operate related authentication. After confirming 
the validity of new nodes, base station or trusted third party will broadcast a message such as new 
nodes’ ID. The node which receives the message will add new nodes’ ID to its neighbor nodes’ 
ID list. 
Finally, if new nodes received message responded by base station or trusted third party, then 
executing neighbor discovery which means broadcasting new nodes’ own pre-distributed keys’ 
ID information and the information of new nodes themselves to check if there exists a pair of 
same ID by checking the list of neighbor nodes’ key ID information and their own ID, if exists, 
then establishing symmetric key directly, if not, finding a safe path to establish symmetric key. 
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 After realizing normal communication the nodes will delete their initial key and some redundant 
key or hash value to ensure communication security of most nodes of the network. 
f. Removing Ineffective Nodes 
As most of the deployment area of nodes is located in complex environments with remote 
location or harsh natural conditions, hardware restrictions of nodes themselves and limited 
battery power increased the probability of failure of nodes. How to delete ineffective nodes 
effectively is one of the important problems we need concern. In RKKU, due to the independence 
of each pair of nodes which have no relationship with other nodes, therefore when nodes exhaust 
all their energy, base station will broadcast the ID of nodes that used up their energy, neighbor 
nodes of which do not communicate with them so that the node get separated with the network. 
As for the condition that nodes were captured, we need suppose that an Intrusion Detection 
System is deployed in a base station or a network to analyze information and data of the 
network., when nodes exist abnormal or suspicious behavior and surrounding nodes make a 
agreement that the node is captured indeed and exists suspicious behavior, then surrounding 
nodes will interrupt communication with the node and report ID of the node to base station. Base 
station will broadcast ID of the node to other safe nodes of the entire network immediately after 
receiving the message and send key update order to all nodes of the network. After receiving key 
update order, the ineffective node will be input current source key to execute update program P, 
then making use of the output to perform hash operation, a hash will be gained as the latest key 
and the key update will be finished. 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 the event that node a is captured will trigger key update 
 
 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
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 It is important assessment standards to security performance and energy expense of nodes for the 
security performance of key management in WSNs. This scheme is mainly aimed at those attack 
models like forgery, monitoring and capture. Forgery is the process that attackers imitating the 
sender and communicating with the receiver directly and acquiring communication information 
from the receiver through forging messages. Attackers are monitoring communication among 
nodes and knowing communication details among nodes by receiving messages sent by nodes. 
Nodes capture is the way that attackers stealing information of nodes through physical nodes 
capture. 
 
a. Nodes Connectivity Analysis 
If symmetric keys can be established between mutual neighbor nodes, we define the link between 
two mutual neighbor nodes as the link that is capable of establishing symmetric key directly. In 
WSN, we can name the ratio occupied by the number of links that is capable of establishing 
symmetric key directly in total link number as safety link probability. 
The way how RKKU deploy its nodes is basically similar with E-G scheme, according to 
Random Graph Theory, it can be referred that if random graph G(N, p) with N nodes expect to 
achieve the given probability Pr of general connectivity, average degree d of nodes should meet 
the following condition at least: 
                 ]))ln(-ln(-)ln([*/)1( rPNNNd                                            (7) 
It can be referred from figure 4 that the increments of nodes is few as Pr increased, the bigger the 
N is, the smoother the curve will be and the expansion of network scale did not have much effect 
on nodes degree. Therefore the connectivity of the entire network can be ensured if nodes are 
able to communicate with their neighbor nodes with certain probability. 
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Figure 4 the relation curve of d, Pr and n
 [1] 
 
According to formula (7) and [1], safety link probability p will be: 
P=
2(( )!)
1-
( 2 )! !
P K
P K P


                                                      (8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 the relation curve of k, P and at least one shared key
 [1] 
 
It can be seen from figure 5 that when the volume of key pool is 10000, just 75 pre-distributed 
keys will enable the probability that each two nodes have at least one shared key between them 
achieve 50%. If allocating 200 keys in advance the possibility of secure connection will achieve 
98%. Increasing the value of K (when P value is fixed) or decreasing the value of P (when the 
value of K is fixed) can improve the possibility of secure connection of the network. Chan
[3]
 has 
demonstrated the principle that when the density of nodes of sensor network is deployed at 
general level, once the probability of secure connection achieved 0.33%, shared session key can 
be established with no more than three hops between two mutual neighbor nodes and the goal can 
be achieved that the possibility of secure connection approaching 100%. 
 
b. Security Analysis 
As nodes usually are deployed in depopulated zone or a hostile environment, restrictions on 
hardware and energy make nodes vulnerable or easy to be captured, how to apply nodes safely is 
the first priority we need to concern. In order to obtain communication keys among nodes, 
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 attacker may use such ways like forgery, monitoring, capture and so on. In this chapter we will 
analyze the security performance of the key update scheme proposed in the paper respectively 
according to the three mention means. 
If attackers attack nodes through forgery, they may capture a node and extract prepared key 
information, next attackers will forge the information of keys or imitate valid nodes carry out 
active assaults to the rest nodes of the network so as to destroy trust relationships, forge sensitive 
information or spread attack. In RKKU, different nodes are required to share different 
communication keys, but the keys originate from initial keys distributed by the key pool. Initial 
key experienced code segments update and hash function operation. Moreover, communication 
process of code segments exchange has been encrypted, so attacking nodes via forge can be 
difficult. 
If attackers choose monitoring as the mean to attack nodes, even if attackers are able to all 
communications of the network, due to the reason that all communications of nodes are 
encrypted by hash value, attackers still have no ability to monitor any communication among 
nodes. Even attackers get current hash value, i.e. communication key by other else complex 
methods, due to the characteristics of safe hash function, computing source key can be very 
difficult for attackers. Before next time pulse approaching, precious communication keys became 
invalid after update, as there is no communication agreement between new keys and previous 
keys, the security of the network will be guaranteed. 
When attacker choose nodes capture as the mean to attack nodes, at worst attackers will 
completely capture nodes after a period of time t (obviously t > Δ T) which means that attackers 
acquire all information of nodes including code segments allocated to captured nodes and 
corresponding hash values i.e. communication keys used among captured nodes and their free 
neighbor nodes. However, those information can not be applied to obtain communication keys 
among captured nodes which means the bad effect of nodes capture on security will be  
minimized because of the reason that initial keys randomly distributed by key pool has been 
deleted. The differences among diverse code segments and the characteristics of unilateral make 
the source password whose update pulse is ΔT can hardly inferred by hash values hence the 
influence on other else non-capture node can nearly be ignored. What’s more, the more nodes 
captured by attackers, the more code segments will reap. With the help of these code segments, 
attackers may obtain all else code segments of some nodes. However attackers do not know the 
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 initial keys which are randomly allocated in advance, let alone the source key used during above 
process. Attackers can not make use of the program built by obtained code segments to gain 
update keys of nodes whose all code segments are decoded. The scheme hence can guarantee 
security when attackers capturing nodes. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the communication link between the damage and the number of the 
captured nodes, when the total number of nodes N is 10000 in the wireless sensor networks. 
Among them, the program parameters p is 1, and k (the number of code fragments) is 50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 the number of captured nodes and the possibility of capturing communication links 
of non-captured nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 the number of captured nodes and the possibility of capturing communication links 
of non-captured nodes 
 
Figure 8 also shows several classic key management schemes to be captured with impaired 
communication link between the numbers of nodes. In Figure 8, we can see that, as the total 
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 number of nodes N is 10000, several classic key management schemes to be captured with 
impaired communication link between the numbers of nodes. In the E-G scheme, program 
parameters of p is 0.33 (two adjacent nodes can take up to three hops to achieve a secure link 
connectivity probability approaching 100%), and K is 200 (the number of key rings).The q-
Composite scheme sets program parameters q = 2 and p = 0.33, The program parameters of the 
CSKU Scheme are p = 1 and k = 50 (the number of code fragments). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 the number of captured nodes and the possibility of capturing communication links 
of non-captured nodes 
 
c. Energy Expense Analysis 
Reducing energy consumption and improving life network cycle are key points of WSNs key 
management. Generally WSNs completes tasks as a whole, but energy consumption of nodes 
directly influenced network life cycle. Therefore when energy expense should be fully considered 
when study WSNs key management scheme. In RKKU, my can discuss the problem according to 
computing, and storage. 
 
c.i Communication Expense 
AKYILDIZIF
 [4-8] 
has demonstrated that executing calculation is more energy saving than 
transmitting messages for sensors. The electrical energy consumption of executing 3000 
computations equal to that of transmitting one bit information, the key management scheme 
hence can add operations properly so as to decrease data transmission. Dynamic key management 
scheme which based on reliable key distribution center and frequent key update became 
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 impractical for transmitting too much data information. In order to simplified the comparison we 
assume that all schemes the same encryption algorithm to generate keys and the length of 
information to be encrypted are equal. The E-G scheme and its modified version need not 
transmit data in large quantity and too much communication expenses, but long tern usage of 
symmetric keys without update has brought new hidden troubles 
[9-13]
. In RKKU, communication 
expenses of nodes mainly generated from exchange code segments when exchanging key 
materials. When keys are at the stage of update, nodes need only transmit the values of variable i 
and cost very few expenses. Table 2 presented communication expenses of several common key 
management schemes and compared them with expenses of key update. 
 
Table 2 the comparison between communication expenses of key management schemes and 
expenses of key update 
Key management 
scheme 
beforehand 
share 
E-G Blom RKKU 
Communication 
expenses 
1 (1 )d k   ( 1)*( 1)d    k d  
Key update expenses / / / 
pass value 
of  i 
  
c.ii Storage and Compute Expenses 
Provided a single instruction character occupied a bit(s) storage space, the amount of single 
operation occupied b bit(s), pre-distributed keys occupied c, hash function occupied f bit(s), the 
average scale of symmetric key g bit(s), the average neighbor number of nodes was d, thus the 
storage space required by RKKU was s bit(s) which met the equation that 
fdgbaks  )1()(* ,as gba  , gf  ,pre-distributed and invalid keys would be 
deleted after a pulse represented by T  while sensor network finished its deployment, so the 
storage space needed by RKKU approximate s bit(s) which met the equation that )1(*  dgs . 
RKKU requires very few expenses, key update need only executing hash operation once and 
arithmetical operation k times, few expenses indeed. Table 3 presented the comparison made 
among several common key management schemes’ storage expenses. 
 
Table 3 Comparison made among several common key management  
Scheme s’ storage expenses 
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 Key management schemes 
beforehand 
share E-G Blom RKKU 
Storage expenses 1 2k 2*1）（   )1(  dg  
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, the writer discusses the advantages and disadvantages of several classic schemes 
and the modified schemes, and analyzes the problem. With the key ID information, the RKKU 
scheme discovers neighbor nodes and saves key ID information corresponding to the key of the 
session up, and then the introduction of a one-way hash functions and code segment updated 
technology to calculate key communications between nodes. The RKKU scheme can achieve low 
power consumption and secure communications, between the base station and nodes, nodes and 
node efficient. Compared with the classic schemes, The RKKU scheme firstly stores only part 
keys and pre-assigned key ID information, and reduces the storage space. Although the 
introduction of a one-way hash functions and code segment, its storage space is very small. 
Secondly, the introduction of one-way hash function ensures that even communication key 
compromise, the attacker cannot use the obtained communication key to decipher the source key, 
so that it affects only two nodes communicate with each other, there is no impact on other nodes. 
Finally, the updating technologies based on the code segment make wireless sensor networks 
with minimal energy cost to complete the update node key, even if the communication key 
compromise, after the next moment comes, the new communications key will automatically 
overwrite leaked key .With regard to our future work, we plan to design a distributed dynamic 
updating key management algorithm and make the RKKU scheme a totally distributed dynamic 
scheme. 
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